CEN/TR 14383-5:2010

SLOVENSKI STANDARD
01-april-2010
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Prevention of crime - Urban planning and building design - Part 5: Petrol stations
Vorbeugende Kriminalitätsbekämpfung - Stadt und Gebäude Planung - Teil 5:
Tankstellen
Prévention de la malveillance - Urbanisme et conception des bâtiments - Partie 5 :
Stations-service
Ta slovenski standard je istoveten z: CEN/TR 14383-5:2010
ICS:
13.310 Varstvo pred kriminalom Protection against crime
91.020 Prostorsko planiranje. Physical planning. Town
Urbanizem planning
91.040.20 Trgovske in industrijske Buildings for commerce and
stavbe industry
2003-01.Slovenski inštitut za standardizacijo. Razmnoževanje celote ali delov tega standarda ni dovoljeno.

TECHNICAL REPORT
CEN/TR 14383-5
RAPPORT TECHNIQUE
TECHNISCHER BERICHT
January 2010
ICS 13.310; 91.020
English Version
Prevention of crime - Urban planning and building design - Part
5: Petrol stations
Prévention de la malveillance - Urbanisme et conception Vorbeugende Kriminalitätsbekämpfung - Stadt- und
des bâtiments - Partie 5 : Stations-service Gebäudeplanung - Teil 5: Tankstellen

This Technical Report was approved by CEN on 10 August 2009. It has been drawn up by the Technical Committee CEN/TC 325.

CEN members are the national standards bodies of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.

EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR STANDARDIZATION
COMITÉ EUROPÉEN DE NORMALISATION

EUROPÄISCHES KOMITEE FÜR NORMUNG

Management Centre: Avenue Marnix 17, B-1000 Brussels
© 2010 CEN All rights of exploitation in any form and by any means reserved Ref. No. CEN/TR 14383-5:2010: E
worldwide for CEN national Members.

Contents Page
Foreword .3
Introduction .4
1 Scope .5
2 Normative references .5
3 Terms and definitions .5
4 Historical background and design .6
4.1 General .6
4.2 The image of the petrol station – First source of prevention .7
4.3 Designing with regard to sociological and psychological factors .7
5 Risk assessment and management in petrol station .8
5.1 General .8
5.2 Local factors .8
5.3 Environmental and social risks .8
5.4 The site .9
5.5 Who are the potential offenders .9
5.6 Types of crime that occur most frequently . 10
6 Security strategy for petrol stations . 12
6.1 General . 12
6.2 Risk analysis . 13
6.3 Vulnerability of site and building . 14
6.4 Security concept . 14
7 Security recommendations for petrol stations . 15
7.1 General . 15
7.2 Identifying the grade of risk and protection required . 15
8 Access to petrol station – perimeter protection . 16
8.1 General . 16
8.2 Requirements . 17
8.3 Forecourt and its secondary activities . 17
9 The main building . 20
9.1 Risk analysis . 20
10 Management . 25
10.1 Staff and manager role . 25
10.2 The part of oil companies and other partners . 25
10.3 Management of the funds in transit in petrol stations . 26
10.4 Maintenance . 26
Annex A (normative) Recommended levels of security . 28
Annex B (informative) Risk analysis of petrol stations vulnerability to the crime . 29
B.1 Introduction . 29
B.2 Risk assessment . 30
B.3 How to fill in the questionnaire . 31
B.4 Application example of the risk analysis . 32
Bibliography . 50

Foreword
This document (CEN/TR 14383-5:2010) has been prepared by Technical Committee CEN/TC 325 “Prevention
of crime by urban planning and building design”, the secretariat of which is held by SNV.
Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent
rights. CEN [and/or CENELEC] shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.
The status of Technical Report (CEN/TR) was proposed to give all countries the opportunity to compare
experiences and to harmonise procedures.
CEN/TR 14383, Prevention of crime ― Urban planning and building design,, consists of the following parts:
1)
 Part 1: Definition of specific terms
 Part 2: Urban planning
 Part 3: Dwellings
 Part 4: Shops and offices
 Part 5: Petrol stations
2)
 Part 6: Schools
 Part 7: Design and management of public transport facilities
 Part 8: Protection of buildings and sites against criminal attacks with vehicles

1) Published as EN 14383-1.
2) Published as prCEN/TR 14383-6.
Introduction
The nature, cost and scale of crime against petrol stations can be hard to quantify and there are many factors
that can influence whether or not an offence is committed. For the purpose of this Technical Report, apart
from the three basic criminological approaches already described in CEN/TS 14383-4, there should be a
further examination of the vulnerability of petrol stations. This vulnerability can depend on multiple factors that
can vary from country to country. The diverse nature of regulations that apply to petrol stations and the
differences in management and trading relations should be accounted for in any risk analysis.
Petrol stations can be described as highly accessible trading sites (they can be reached by foot or by car and
can be left immediately). They can be quite isolated in space (even for citizen urban petrol stations)
sometimes because of their size, their small number of staff, and/or because they have a multiple and free
service function (fuel, food shop, drinks, accessories, car maintenance, etc.), with a wide opening time to the
public.
In addition, factors that do not depend directly on the location of the petrol station and its activities should be
taken into account, i.e. the general physical and social environment, the retailer's commercial strategies, the
power of reaction of law enforcement agencies (police, gendarmerie, local police department).
The result is that crime in petrol stations varies in rate and nature according to the accumulation of the
described risk factors, which means that producing uniform modes of management and security equipments
for petrol stations is very difficult. In practice, each petrol station should be subject to individual analysis in
order to optimize the safety strategies and apply the most efficient tools to prevent crime.
1 Scope
This Technical Report gives guidelines for a recommended strategy for efficiently combating the different
types of crime liable to be committed against petrol stations.
NOTE Crimes that are liable to be committed against petrol stations could include: armed robbery, violent theft,
burglary (usually by breaking in at night), theft, fraud (failure to pay, use of stolen credit cards or cheques and other
frauds), arson, vandalism and other crimes and offences.
This Technical Report is applicable to new and existing petrol station buildings that are open to and accessible
by the public.
2 Normative references
The following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of this document. For dated
references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced
document (including any amendments) applies.
EN 356, Glass in building ― Security glazing ― Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack
EN 1063, Glass in building ― Security glazing ― Testing and classification of resistance against bullet attack
EN 1143-1, Secure storage units ― Requirements, classification and methods of test for resistance to
burglary ― Part 1: Safes, ATM safes, strongroom doors and strongrooms
EN 1303, Building hardware ― Cylinders for locks ― Requirements and test methods
EN 1522, Windows, doors, shutters and blinds ― Bullet resistance ― Requirements and classification
ENV 1627, Windows, doors, shutters ― Burglar resistance ― Requirements and classification
EN 14383-1:2006, Prevention of crime ― Urban planning and building design ― Part 1: Definition of specific
terms
CEN/TS 14383-4:2006, Prevention of crime ― Urban planning and design ― Part 4: Shops and offices
EN 50132-7, Alarm systems ― CCTV surveillance systems for use in security applications ― Part 7:
Application guidelines
3 Terms and definitions
For the purposes of this document, the terms and definitions given in EN 14383-1:2006 and the following
apply.
3.1
petrol station
liquid fuel supplying point for motor vehicles that provides supplies for the operation of motor vehicles, and
can provide other services as well (i.e. food, catering, car wash, maintenance and car repair, emergency car
repair)
3.2
petrol
liquid fuel comprising a mixture of several hydrocarbons that are derived from petroleum refining and/or
organic fuel, and which is used to power combustion engines
4 Historical background and design
4.1 General
The occupation of petrol supply to the general public has greatly changed over time from the petrol pump and
emergency car repair to petrol self service and the multi service station.
The evolution towards the multi purpose service station may have satisfied the customer's need, but it has
also created new opportunities of crime.
A new community business is created that satisfies the customer's need, but it is a business attractive pole
located on very different sites that may generate problems that were unknown till then, ranging from
vandalism, misuse of space to breaking in, armed robbery, racketing, drug use and trafficking, means of
payment fraud, soliciting within the frame of prostitution, etc.
A petrol station is a typical example of a vulnerable business because of the existence of endogenous and
exogenous factors that are linked with petrol supply.
The evolution of this business and the development of trading and service activities make the targeted sites
vulnerable to crime because of the three following characteristics:
 the opening to the public with an access up to 24 hours and seven days;
 a certain isolation linked with the specific requirements and regulations that apply to this type of
installation;
 a reduced human presence for economical reasons.
The interest that may be given by a petrol station to a criminal is not only linked to the profit itself but also to
the easiness for committing the crime, the supposed quickness of execution together with a supposed
reduction of risks taken by the criminal.
Petrol stations may be broken into five groups according to their geographic location:
 motorway petrol stations;
 ring and main road petrol stations;
 shopping centre petrol stations;
 urban district petrol stations;
 rural petrol stations.
The definition of security of a petrol station may be summed up by the consideration of:
 the site location;
 the local environment;
 the structure and the shape of the building (to protect the staff, the customers and their belongings
from any attack).
The main design factors include:
 the physical location;
 the accesses;
 the location of doors and windows;
 the access control;
 the pedestrian and vehicle flow;
 vulnerable indoor and outdoor areas;
 formal and informal human surveillance.
Significant results in crime and anti-social behaviour control may be obtained by considering these elements
of the architectural approach and taking into account their impact on safety at the design stage and by
keeping in mind management measures at the same time.
To achieve this, planners, oil companies, owners, managers, in close relationship with urban planners,
architects and designers, as well as professionals with crime prevention expertise should form the design
team and should be involved to ensure that crime prevention factors are included in the design.
4.2 The image of the petrol station – First source of prevention
A criminal's first impression can have a great influence on their decision on whether or not to commit a crime.
A well maintained petrol station that is clean and neat may give an impression of comfort and even wealth, but
it may also be a message that the employees that work there are proud of their working place and are more
liable to protect it.
If the staff is encouraged to work as a team, improve the environment and defend the territory against
criminals, crime may be reduced and the quality of service for customers may be improved. Two ways of
achieving this goal are:
 designing spaces in order to give the petrol station a clear identity;
 providing the maximum possible surveillance by a direct or indirect presence. Criminals do not like to
be seen and wherever possible, it is also advised to encourage a mixing of use and occupation. This
can result in more individuals being present to provide any formal surveillance.
4.3 Designing with regard to sociological and psychological factors
The joint design team should consider the various factors that can influence the opportunity to commit crime.
The following are some of the most important factors:
a) Ownership
It is essential that the design of space be such that customers are immediately aware that they are in a private
commercial space that is open to the public, and that they behave accordingly. In this case, it is less probable
that a crime or an anti-social behaviour occurs without provoking a reaction from the staff or the customers.
b) Presence
One of the essential prevention factors to crime is the risk of being seen and identified. Therefore, human
presence and natural surveillance are very important. The design of the petrol station should be carried out to
allow clear sight lines and provide wide natural surveillance from the staff, the customers and public and
private security forces. For the same reasons, buildings should front onto public spaces.
Fear of crime, whether real or perceived by the customers or the staff, needs to be considered and the design
of the petrol stations should take it into account.
c) Conflict minimization linked with misuse of space
Any design feature preventing space clarity that could give rise to a potential conflict situation having direct
and durable consequences on the business activity of the site should be avoided, e.g. a low fence wall that
could be used as seating, badly designed parking space that could be used as a point for drug dealing.
Features that are badly designed can attract criminal activities and generate a fear of crime that can dissuade
the customers from using the petrol station.
5 Risk assessment and management in petrol station
5.1 General
The typology of risk that may be considered in petrol stations may vary more or less according to the category
of the petrol station as defined in 4.1.
The petrol station is generally a semi-closed space marking a separate space with the road.
It is also a commodity space-taking customers who know what they will get various services.
Within the framework of any new building or renovation development, it is necessary to analyse the type of
crime that could reasonably be expected to occur. It is essential to identify the crime and anti-social behaviour
that belongs to the concerned site in its present or future layout. The primary aim is always to try and deter
crime happening in the first instance (see 6.1).
Any crime prevention strategy is essentially one of risk management. Thus, before an effective strategy can
be developed, it is important to identify and understand the risk factors involved.
5.2 Local factors
When assessing the level of risk, it is essential to give priority to local factors. This should involve the
identification of the crime types in the immediate neighbourhood, to identify the type of crime reported, where
and when incidents occurred and who the victims were. This may be achieved by spatial mapping to identify
crime clustering or hot spots in connection with law enforcement agencies.
It is also important to be aware that factors that may influence the opportunity for crime may not necessarily
be in the immediate locality. For example, the lack of meeting places in a given area may attract young people
to the space offered and the goods on sale.
Where the development is on a new site, it may be that there has been no previous crime problem or records
do not exist. In these cases, it is important to consider the proposed development in terms of potential crime
generation in order to determine the types of crime or anti-social behaviour that could reasonably be expected
to result from this development being completed.
Guidance on methods for assessing the risk of crime and methods aimed at reducing these risks in
neighbourhoods, town centres and industrial estates, is given in CEN/TR 14383-2.
5.3 Environmental and social risks
At the building design stage, security provisions should be considered taking into account the specific location
of the petrol station, decisions taken by agencies external to the petrol suppliers system (state or local
authorities, officials). In this context, they are a whole series of operators whose action directly influences the
policy of security in petrol stations, e.g. a policy that leads to protect the petrol station staff but whose
consequence is to move the insecurity towards the exterior areas and the customers or security measures
relying on technical standards, e.g. fire fighting requirements to prevent the blocking of vehicle at the level of
petrol pumps.
The physical and sociological environment of the petrol station should also be taken into account as well as
the space in which it is located without forgetting the all of environmental and social factors knowing that these
elements are liable to evolve with time.
5.4 The site
Consideration should be given to the following:
a) The selection of the location of premises may be justified by the market requirements and other factors,
for example security.
b) The security provisions that depend on the chosen location, taking into account:
1) the types of crime that may occur if buildings are in high crime areas or known crime generators; and
2) any special considerations, for example if the premises are in a suburban area with different
requirements.
c) Existing or potential levels of local delinquency as burglary, theft, arson and other crime and offences.
Proximity to areas of public gathering including football and other sports grounds, licensed premises or
playgrounds.
d) The security problems may be influenced by natural or geographical features such as rivers, stream,
waste ground, hiding place, the weather, the season or seasonal factors such as influx of tourists.
e) Advantages that can be obtained from proximity to law enforcement agencies, fire and ambulance
stations or from the existing security perimeters of well maintained premises with high walls or fences.
f) Illumination and coverage provided by existing street lighting.
g) Levels of security that owners and occupiers of other premises in the district apply to their premises.
h) Natural surveillance, i.e. the extent to which property can be seen from other premises.
i) Consideration of other facilities and the neighbourhood (e.g. foods).
5.5 Who are the potential offenders
 Organized gangs;
 armed robbers;
 drug users;
 burglars;
 shop lifters;
 fraud specialists;
 arsonist;
 vandals;
 etc.
5.6 Types of crime that occur most frequently
5.6.1 General
Petrol stations suffer crime similar to the ones inflected on shops. By nature, the offences committed against
petrol stations depend on the time of the day. Crimes like armed robbery, theft, fraud, occur during opening
time. Crime like burglary and arson take place during closing time, i.e. more often at night. Petrol stations
should be equipped with several types of protection against several types of crime according to the time of the
day.
It should also be remembered that work practices are changing and that petrol stations are having longer
periods of opening or staying open 24 hours and seven days. The risk assessment should therefore allow for
these variations.
5.6.2 Armed robbery
Armed robberies, aimed at the cash and more rarely the safe.
In many cases the cashier is assaulted but these crimes also target the petrol station takings during transfer to
the bank especially at the end of long weekends and holiday rush, bank holidays. The assault is then directed
against the manager of the petrol station itself. Armed robberies that take place at night target more petrol
stations with badly protected cashiers as shopping centre petrol stations are then either closed or turned on
automatic operation. These robberies are as easy to commit as the station offers easy access and escape
routes.
5.6.3 Burglary
Burglaries of petrol stations usually occur when the premises are empty, they target goods in the store, the
safe and the storage room. All techniques are used including ram vehicle able to smash the walls of the petrol
station that are not always sufficiently protected.
Burglaries are easier to commit where the petrol station structure is weak, especially at the roof level.
5.6.4 Theft of goods/shoplifting
It is obvious that petrol stations, because of their anonymous customers and of possibilities of quick escape
for criminals, encourage this type of offence. This situation makes up an attractive field for the commission of
shoplifting that may concern food products, car maintenance accessories (car radios), books, magazines, etc.
The good display in the shop is particularly vulnerable.
It is essential to bring special attention to the display and fitting out of goods for sale to reduce the risk of
shoplifting.
5.6.5 Making off without payment
Various offences whose purpose is to obtain fuel, lubricants or goods and to leave the petrol station without
paying are often committed by:
a) somebody helping you while knowing that you are unable to pay or unwilling to pay the amount owed.
3)
This includes filling part or all of a tank by the pump attendant or petrol supplying professional ;
b) helping oneself and not paying (a self-service petrol station).

3) The legal classification of the crime may vary according to the national legislation.
5.6.6 Fraud
The fraudulent use of means aimed at obtaining funds, values, goods or the supplying of a service by:
a) the use of stolen or falsified means of payment: credit cards, payment cards, check books, etc.;
b) the use of forged bank notes.
Most of these offences are committed by experienced criminals, at least because of the need to prepare the
means used to commit the offence.
5.6.7 Arson
Because of the presence of highly flammable or explosive products (gas bottles, LPG-c, G.N.V.), petrol
stations are particularly sensitive to the risk of arson.
5.6.8 Vandalism
These are wilful acts of destruction or damage, including graffiti, especially against the facilities available to
the customers of the petrol station.
5.6.9 Misuse of space
This phenomenon usually occurs where young offenders aggressively dominate the area. This behaviour can
be a threat to customers and can lead to damage to petrol station facilities. It can also have an adverse effect
on the petrol station's business.
Other examples of this type of phenomenon can be through prostitution, traveller occupation of the site and
drug trafficking.
5.6.10 Assault and robbery against customers
They are acquisitive crimes characterized by theft from the vehicles, or robbery against the driver or
passengers, or theft of cargo or truck itself as well as theft of vehicle often performed by violence (car jacking).
The criminals are generally young experienced offenders coming from nearby suburbs or moving delinquency
(travellers). According to opportunities (luxury cars, foreign registration plate, with displayed expensive
personal belongings, with no specific surveillance of the area or no human presence nearby, weak lighting,
possibility to know the nature of the cargo in a vehicle parked on a rest area, absence of the owner, etc.) they
decide to commit the offence or not.
In cases of violent robbery, these groups generally operate by teams in fast cars and often make a succession
of several operations on a given route by provoking by example fake accidents to force the driver potential
victim to stop his car.
The action is always backed up by an excellent knowledge of the area, of the escape means and routes (e.g.
locating of technical exits in motorway fencing, weapons, nails boxes to puncture the tyres of following
vehicles, etc.). The attack is generally brutal and quick in order to impress the victims and to deter them from
reacting.
5.6.11 Attacks against payment systems
They are acts intended to obtain in a fraudulent way confidential data relating to the customer's cards of
payment (number of the card, name of the holder, confidential code, validity date, check code, etc.) without his
knowledge, to even recover physically the means of payment itself.
The aim of the delinquents is to obtain by these means money, goods or services.
The hacking of these data and sometimes theft of means of payment use technical devices mixing mechanics,
electronics and/or video. These systems adding then themselves to the technical equipment of the payment
device.
These offences can take place with the complicity of an employee.
6 Security strategy for petrol stations
6.1 General
The overall strategy for preventing crime in petrol stations should include consideration of the following points:
 the petrol station manager's contract binding him to his supplier or his employer;
 the operating conditions;
 the business opening times;
 the geographical and social environment;
 the crime level reported; and
 the views of staff working at the site.
All technical and human measures to be taken to fight crime should be analysed according to the following
four levels:
 deterrence (dissuasion of attack);
 denial (blocking the attack);
 delay (slowing down the attack);
 alarm (emergency and/or detection devices and procedures allowing to advise law-enforcement
forces that an attack is in progress).
The result of the above analysis should be used to formulate the overall security plan. It is essential that all
petrol stations, whatever their nature or mode of operation and characteristics, should have a security plan.
This plan should cover all security measures and be shown to, and understood by, all employees.
Any policy of protection of petrol stations should incorporate and combine in a smooth way technical
prevention and deterrence measures with the surveillance and prevention human plan of action, keeping in
mind that official security forces are only seldom able to operate on site at the time of occurrence of the crime.
Whatever the case, any security strategy implies choices that will condition the efficiency of prevention
measures, taken to the crime whatever it is. These choices concern:
 the location of petrol stations;
 the internal organisation of the petrol station both on space and building level;
 protection facilities;
 human management.
Certain difficulties appear and must be solved. They concern for example responsibility disputes when
security equipments are managed by other actors than the operator, e.g. the public street lighting which is
managed by the local authorities, or that this equipment is in opposition with other security requirements (fire
fighting or emergency exits of persons). On the other hand, the policy of the oil companies should be taken
into account, if applicable, whether they have implemented uniform procedures or have a case approach, for
each petrol station.
It should not be forgotten that:
 the reinforcement of security in a site is liable to lead to a transfer to other sites less equipped;
 the supplying of petrol can often be secondary to other activities on the site such as the selling of
cars;
 certain modes of operation (pre payment before petrol supply, automatic petrol supply), differentiated
management of flows (lorries and private cars) are able to bring an answer to security problems;
 the notion of time or schedule should also be taken into account within the framework of technical
and human security management, day/night, week, weekend and bank holidays;
 the important issue of human resources management, most of oil operators setting the number of the
staff according to the quantity of petrol distributed, shop turnover, opening times.
NOTE In this context it should be noted that the recruitment modalities sometimes lead to make beginners in petrol
stations highly concerned by the existing crime level, which makes it difficult to employ stable staff.
In the field of security, the nature and quantity of initial and continuous training given to the various actors
according to the level of responsibilities should be adapted.
In any security policy, the staff motivation should be taken into account, as a lack of motivation may be
weakened by the repetition of delinquent acts without supporting management.
Finally, the response of law enforcement agencies, their prevention and their investigative priorities should be
taken into account in formulating a security strategy as often there is a gap between the expectancy of
operators and the service that can actually be provided by the police.
6.2 Risk analysis
To formulate a security plan, it is first necessary to complete an in-depth risk assessment, in order to assess
the security level needed for a petrol station. The following factors are amongst those that should be
considered:
a) type of business (petrol supplying, gas bottles, food shop, catering, repair and maintenance, car wash
area, parking and rest area);
b) attractiveness to the criminal for goods, petrol, products, spare parts, tires, cash and property belonging to
the customers, cars, personal belongings, valuables, etc.;
c) potential escape routes for the removal of stolen goods (the escape route may not be the same as the
entry route);
d) ease of access from either the streets, open areas, adjacent roofs, floors above and below the premises
concerned if not under single occupancy, and from adjoining premises;
e) degree of inherent security of the premises in relation to its construction;
f) vulnerability relative to local trends in crime;
g) surveillance provided either by normal public activity, routine police patrol in the area or by security
patrolling of the premises and/or its surroundings;
h) installation of safety devices like alarm detection system or CCTV;
i) the level of watch and attitude of the staff present on the site.
All the factors may vary according to time criteria (business season, opening times, evolution of petrol prices,
etc.). See a risk analysis in Annex B.
6.3 Vulnerability of site and building
In addition to the criteria given in 6.2, the analysis should also include consideration of the following three
types of space around the building. Each type of space has special conditions requiring assessment before
incorporation into the overall security plan:
 peripheral space: the grounds and environment around the site(s) externally from the fence;
 perimetric space: space from the fence to the façade walls of the building, including the fence, the
forecourt, the parking spaces and the openings of the building;
 volumetric space: the enclosed area within the building.
Required risk and protection levels should then be identified by respecting the zonal approach as defined in
CEN/TS 14383-4 from the more general to the more particular, from the environment to the interior spaces,
i.e.
 accessibility to petrol station;
 the forecourt and its second activities;
 the protection of the shop, which is the genuine commercial space of petrol stations (see Clause 8).
6.4 Security concept
It should be outlined that the installation of a petrol station is subject to very strict regulations applicable to
classified installation. Therefore, the risk analysis will largely depend on the applicable regulations according
to the country, and on physical and geographical conditions that are imposed at the creation of new petrol
stations.
Nevertheless, generally speaking, to optimize the concept of security in petrol station, the study shall focus on
taking into account the following provisions:
a) an assessment of the risk in relation to the value of the property and the items that are to be protected,
including any fire or insurance requirements that should be carried out;
b) the design of the building and the security measures employed should ensure as far as possible that
potential intruders cannot gain entry to the premises unseen or detected;
c) the interior layout of petrol station store should be planned so as to minimize losses due to theft;
d) to organize the distribution and control of car and pedestrian flow on the forecourt, in the shop and the
technical areas by distinguishing, if possible, entries and exits of customers, staff and suppliers;
e) to fit in and maintain all of the mechanical and electronic security devices concerning the three spaces;
f) to employ staff that is well trained and motivated to security – safety and capable to use these devices;
g) facilities should be provided for the protection of cash;
h) to protect electrical power supplies and telephone lines and cables for transmitting alarm signals for
emergency;
i) new and second hand vehicles should be kept in secured areas and under surveillance;
j) precautions should be put in place for the storage and sell of hazardous products (gas bottles, white
spirit, etc.);
k) to fit in an adapted and performing lighting system;
l) the installation of approved CCTV surveillance systems to both the exterior and interior of the premises;
m) the provision where possible of safe places for the staff to retreat to or serve from to minimise the risk of
assault. For example this could be a lockable room or a counter area providing a physical barrier;
n) a means by which staff can raise the alarm.
7 Security recommendations for petrol stations
7.1 General
There is no unique general and absolute solution but a set of measures which given the general layout of the
petrol station will result in either a total transformation or a great improvement of its security, knowing that the
provisions are often different for a new petrol station than for the renovation of an existing structure.
The nature and structure of the site space are the pivotal points of any security strategy as it affects directly
the security on site (organized by the petrol station manager) and indirectly the security outside the site (law
enforcement agencies).
A few main lines for prevention:
 Space should be mastered and to achieve this goal, it would be useful to break it into spaces in order
to better control the flows. A clear and neat design of both the outside and inside of the building may
help the surveillance of the site especially when it is associated with good natural and artificial
lighting.
 Protection technology only has a meaning if it is a link of a security chain on the site whose strength
depends directly on the motivation and know-how of the staff who will have to bring an active
contribution to the considered strategy.
The security in petrol stations depends on the level of interaction between the technological element and the
human element, this level being itself dependent on the proper integration of these two elements which are
the result of a well thought strategy.
 Last, it is necessary to conciliate permanently an open commercial attitude with a firm attitude in the
use of protection techniques. What matters is to build up a close team with a leader who will have to
rely on certain networks (community policemen, local planning authorities, etc.) and to facilitate the
action of police and justice authorities by reporting systematically any event even if it does not justify
the filling of a complaint. A petrol station manager should try to provide any element coming from for
example the protection technical measures installed on the site to allow the identification of criminals
4)
(CCTV ).
7.2 Identifying the grade of risk and protection required
In order to establish identifiable levels of risk, see a list of reference for activities in Annex A.

4) In compliance with national regulations.
To each one of these risks corresponds a security level (see Table 1).
Table 1 — Requirements concerning elements and equipment, in relation with the security level
required
Level of protection
Service stations
Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3 Grade 4 Grade 5
Building part / equipment
Doors
1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 4-6
ENV 1627 - resistance class
Windows
1-2 1-3 3 3-4 4
ENV 1627 - resistance class
1 2 2-3 3-4 4-5
Shutters
If the test shutter is used together with a burglar resistant window or a door, the
ENV 1627 - resistance class
resistance class can be reduced.
Fixed and moveable grilles
Roller grilles and curtain
2 3 4 5 6
walling
ENV 1627 - resistance class
Glazed parts
P4A / P5A / P6B / P7B / P8B /
EN 356, Class
double glazing double glazing P4A P4A P6B
See also ENV 1627
Cylinder for locks
EN 1303, class 4 4 5 5* 5*
See also ENV 1627
All enclosures reinforced,
(polycarbonate, iron or no no yes yes yes
plywood panelling)
Perimeter protection
The use of collision barriers is dependent on the building accesses and the accessibility
Collision barriers (road blocks,
of the site with vehicles.
bollards, barriers)
CCTV surveillance
optional optional optional yes yes
EN 50132-7
The application of CCTV surveillance is dependent of the situation of the place
Alarm systems
optional optional
Intrusion system 2
...