CWA 15756:2007

SLOVENSKI STANDARD
01-marec-2008
Humanitarno protiminsko delovanje (HMA) - Osebna varovalna oprema (PPE) -
Preskus in ocena
Humanitarian mine action (HMA) - Personal protective equipment (PPE) - Test and
evaluation
Ta slovenski standard je istoveten z: CWA 15756:2007
ICS:
13.340.10
2003-01.Slovenski inštitut za standardizacijo. Razmnoževanje celote ali delov tega standarda ni dovoljeno.

CEN
CWA 15756
WORKSHOP
December 2007
AGREEMENT
ICS 13.340.10
English version
Humanitarian mine action (HMA) - Personal protective
equipment (PPE) - Test and evaluation
This CEN Workshop Agreement has been drafted and approved by a Workshop of representatives of interested parties, the constitution of
which is indicated in the foreword of this Workshop Agreement.
The formal process followed by the Workshop in the development of this Workshop Agreement has been endorsed by the National
Members of CEN but neither the National Members of CEN nor the CEN Management Centre can be held accountable for the technical
content of this CEN Workshop Agreement or possible conflicts with standards or legislation.
This CEN Workshop Agreement can in no way be held as being an official standard developed by CEN and its Members.
This CEN Workshop Agreement is publicly available as a reference document from the CEN Members National Standard Bodies.
CEN members are the national standards bodies of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.
EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR STANDARDIZATION
COMITÉ EUROPÉEN DE NORMALISATION
EUROPÄISCHES KOMITEE FÜR NORMUNG
Management Centre: rue de Stassart, 36  B-1050 Brussels
© 2007 CEN All rights of exploitation in any form and by any means reserved worldwide for CEN national Members.
Ref. No.:CWA 15756:2007 D/E/F
Contents Page
Foreword .3
0 Introduction.4
1 Scope.6
2 References.6
3 Definitions.6
4 Background to the database of demining accidents and brief analysis. .6
5 Risks, protection and test scenarios.6
5.1 Background.6
5.2 Protection.7
5.3 Distances.7
5.4 Hazard levels.8
6 Test Methodologies.8
6.1 Background.8
6.2 Ballistic test.9
6.2.1 Background.9
6.2.2 Test parameters.9
6.3 Blast test.9
6.3.1 Background.9
6.3.2 Test equipment.10
6.3.3 Preparation.11
6.4 Ergonomic Suitability test.12
6.4.1 Background.12
6.4.2 Ergonomic assessment by the wearer.13
Annex A Ergonomic suitability test – Exercise, questionnaire and scoring.14
A.1 General.14
A.2 PPE for general examination and ergonomic testing.14
A.3 Examination of PPE.14
A.3.1 Principles.14
A.3.2 Test panels for user trials.14
A.3.3 Preliminary examination of PPE .14
A.3.4 Procedure for size verification.14
A.4 Ergonomic assessment by wearer trial.15
A.4.1 General.15
A.4.2 Calculation of the ergonomic score .15
A.4.3 Interpretation of the ergonomic score .15
A.4.4 Questions, prescribed movements, and scoring.15
A.5 Exercise, questionnaire and scoring.15
A.5.1 General.15
A.5.2 Fit and adjustability.15
A.5.3 Putting on and taking off .16
A.5.4 Standing with arm movements .16
A.5.5 In front of body reach.17
A.5.6 Lying down and getting up.17
A.5.7 Exercising.17
A.5.8 Irritation.18
Bibliography.19

Foreword
This CEN Workshop Agreement has been drafted and approved by a Workshop of representatives of
interested parties on 2006-06-18, the constitution of which was supported by CEN following the public
call for participation made on 2006-06-18.
A list of the individuals and organizations which supported the technical consensus represented by this
CEN Workshop Agreement is available to purchasers from the CEN Management Centre. These
organizations were drawn from the following economic sectors: non governmental organizations,
national authorities and producers and users of demining equipment.
The formal process followed by the Workshop in the development of this CEN Workshop Agreement
has been endorsed by the National Members of CEN but neither the National Members of CEN nor the
CEN Management Centre can be held accountable for the technical content of this CEN Workshop
Agreement or possible conflict with standards or legislation. This CEN Workshop Agreement can in no
way be held as being an official standard developed by CEN and its members.
The final review/endorsement round for this CWA was started on 2007-03-13 and was successfully
closed on 2007-09-22 .The final text of this CWA was submitted to CEN for publication on 2007-10-10.
This CEN Workshop Agreement is publicly available as a reference document from the National
Members of CEN: AENOR, AFNOR, ASRO, BDS, BSI, CSNI, CYS, DIN, DS, ELOT, EVS, IBN, IPQ,
IST, LVS, LST, MSA, MSZT, NEN, NSAI, ON, PKN, SEE, SIS, SIST, SFS, SN, SNV, SUTN and UNI.
Comments or suggestions from the users of this CEN Workshop Agreement are welcome and should
be addressed to the CEN Management Centre.
0 Introduction
0.1 The presence of landmines and other explosive remnants of war represent a serious safety
hazard and a major obstacle to reconstruction and development. Landmine Monitor, 2006, from the
International Committee to Ban Landmines, estimates at least 86 countries in eight areas in the world to
be contaminated. Recent conflicts have added a new generation of threats, which those engaged in
Humanitarian Mine Action have to deal with alongside the more familiar mines and booby traps.
The current methodologies for clearance are varied and include elements such as mechanical ground
preparation, scent detection by animals and the processing of ground by human deminers. This latter
activity is the most common, forming part of the fundamental core of every demining programme.
Globally, the most common approach to ground mine clearance is still the use of manual deminers
covering the ground with the aid of a variety of tools and assets that may include Explosive Detecting
Animals and machines. When animals are used, human assets control the animals and check their
indications. When machines are used, they can assist the process and may sometimes be effective in
reducing the area that must be cleared, but human assets are still used to check their effectiveness and
deal with discovered devices. All currently recognised methods of manual mine clearance involve
people being inside a zone of increased risk at some period of time. Protective equipment issued to
these individuals varies widely, and its proven effectiveness against explosive threats is often uncertain.
The methods currently used to determine appropriate protective equipment are based on NATO
STANAG 2920 (Ballistic Test Method for Personal Armour Materials and Combat Clothing. 31 July
2003) which is designed for ballistic protection against projectiles and is often considered to be
inappropriate for demining activities and the range of threats that can be anticipated – in particular for
AP blast mines with low metal content. For example, IMAS 10.30 (Safety and occupational health -
Personal protective equipment), states: “Such tests for ballistic protection do not realistically replicate
mine effects, but will continue to be used until an accepted alternative is developed as an international
standard".
Some accidental initiation of devices is recognised as being inevitable during demining. Processes,
procedures and good management form the core basis for protection, but personal protective
equipment (PPE) provides the final line of defence against human errors and malfunctions. In many
cases, effective PPE can prevent seriously disabling injuries. Humanitarian principles and the legal
aspects of an employer’s “duty of care” make it essential to limit the injuries that result by the provision
of effective PPE. To achieve this reliably, it is necessary to provide a baseline and clearly defined set of
test and evaluation agreed methodologies.
0.2 The Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, “Action
against Anti Personnel Landmines: Reinforcing the Contribution of the European Union”, calls for the
establishment of international Specifications and Methodology and their implementation, in close co-
operation with CEN, ISO, and the UN. The CEN BT/WG 126 “Humanitarian Mine Action” delivered the
CEN response to the EC “Mandate to the European Standardisation Bodies on Technologies for
Humanitarian Demining” (M/306), interpreted to cover humanitarian mine action as an action plan in
March 2002. A particular action to identify a PPE standard for deminers was identified and
subsequently confirmed in October 2005.
0.3 With the focus on deminers’ needs, a methodology for testing PPE has been developed. It is
scientifically vigorous, repeatable and with results that give the possibility to compare the performance
of other equipment on the market. It requires a scenario with typical threats, test facilities where
deminers’ working positions can be replicated and the effects from the blast of simulated buried mines
can be measured. Although it is not within the scope of this workshop to set specific levels of protection,
the workshop felt that some definitions were required in a number of areas and these will be seen
throughout the document. To be able to form a test procedure an idea of type and size of the PPE is
needed. Protective equipment will usually reduce the performance of the user. There is a point at which
the discomfort and degradation in performance of the deminer will exceed the benefit provided to him.
While this workshop does not define this point, the procedures outlined in the section on ergonomic
testing can be used as guidance for evaluating different PPE.
The conclusions are based on experiences from the field, available data of accidents occurring during
mine clearance and knowledge of existing techniques. The results of this workshop agreement can
provide guidance to the IMAS Review Board.
0.4 The test methodology is intended to give guidance to key stakeholders involved in the design,
utilisation and procurement of PPE. It should be noted that the individual tests are designed to be
pragmatic and relatively cost-effective and as such, not all tests may be statistically valid.
Current standards require PPE to provide eye protection at a safety distance of 60 cm from the threat,
but observations as part of this workshop indicated that deminers were operating with their eye
protection closer to 45 cm from the threat. As the deminer moves closer, the risk of injuries caused by
blunt trauma and blast, increase. These injuries are not included in this document and should be the
subject of further investigation.
The V values used in this document are based on the current materials used for the manufacture of
PPE. In the future, as new materials become available, the values may need to be revised in light of
such developments.
A repeatable test methodology for testing the protective material’s capacity to protect against hot
fragments is currently not available. The workshop recommends that actions are taken to develop a test
methodology covering this aspect of protection.
Current IMAS give no guidance on the requirements for the optical quality of eye protection. The need
for such a requirement has been acknowledged in the work within this workshop. Within the framework
of this workshop it was not possible to investigate the technical possibility to set a level for optical
quality together with a high level of ballistic protection. It is recommended that further investigation is
undertaken on this subject. A methodology to measure the optical quality already exists in the European
Standard EN 167:2001, Personal eye-protection - Optical test methods.

Humanitarian mine action (HMA) — Personal protective equipment
(PPE) — Test and evaluation
WARNING - This standard does not purport to address all safety problems associated with its use. It is
the responsibility of the user to establish appropriate health and safety practices and to ensure
compliance with any national regulatory conditions when conducting the tests within this CWA. The
local safety regulations for the test site should also be read and followed.
1 Scope
This document specifies methods for the testing, evaluation, and acceptance of PPE for mine action
against anti-personnel blast mines.
Testing for protection against anti-personnel fragmentation mines is excluded.
Only critical, life threatening and vision affecting injuries are addressed.
NOTE It is recognised that hazards from AP fragmentation mines do occur and that it may be desirable to
assess this specific requirement as part of a separate process.
2 References
The documents referenced are listed in the bibliography.
3 Definitions
For the purposes of this document, the terms and definitions given in the international mine action
standards IMAS 04.10 [1] (second edition incorporating amendments 1, 2 and 3) apply.
4 Background to the database of demining accidents and brief analysis.
The Database of Demining Accidents (DDAS) held at the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD) was used for the purposes of this workshop. The threat to deminers is reasonably
well documented and the database offers a good overview of the casualties that occur to deminers
during operations. Based on these data, the focus is on the situation when the deminer is working close
to, or with, the anti-personnel blast mine.
5 Risks, protection and test scenarios
5.1 Background
The PPE provided for the deminer shall minimise the risk of fatal and critical (life-threatening) injuries as
well as injuries affecting the vision.
All PPE will cause the deminer some degradation in performance due to increased weight, reduced
opportunity for body cooling, reduced mobility/flexibility and so on. It is therefore important that the level
of protection should be balanced against the need for protection and the operating environment. If this
balance is not achieved, the performance degradation can be counter-productive and possibly be a
contributory factor in any accident. Annex A establishes procedures for testing ergonomic suitability.
5.2 Protection
This CWA describes tests that are designed to test PPE which covers the torso (excluding the back)
including the shoulders, front of armpits, neck, and groin. See figure 1.
The face, extending to the full height of the head, should also be protected. The face is defined as the
frontal part of the head extending to just in front of the ears, just below the chin and extending to the top
of the head.
Figure 1 — Designated areas for protection
In the event of an exploding anti-personnel blast mine, the deminer is exposed to acceleration forces
that come from the combination of the pressure from the blast wave and the streaming flow from the
blast ejecta. This causes “blunt trauma” to the body. Based on the report "Effectiveness of Personal
Protective Equipment (PPE) for Use in Demining AP Landmines"[2], blunt trauma on the torso has been
demonstrated not to be critical with a chest-mine distance of 60 cm. This appears to be reinforced with
the data from the DDAS.
There is currently insufficient data available to define the risk of blunt trauma to the head and more
studies are needed. As a result, measurement and consideration of blunt trauma to the head and body
have not been included.
All regions to be protected should have ballistic protection that will withstand secondary fragments from
exploding anti-personnel blast mines.
NOTE For the purposes of this document and related testing, secondary fragments are fragments that are
picked up and ejected from the seat of the explosion including remains from parts of AP blast mines.
5.3 Distances
An exploding anti-personnel blast mine will normally form a blast cone. The blast effect of an explosion
is quickly reduced over distance. If the operator is too close to a mine (depending on a number of
factors including size of charge, distance, type of soil and burial depth), the blast impact will be so
significant that no viable PPE will protect the deminer.
The deminer’s working position when prodding for or exposing an AP blast mine, as well as the
distance from the AP blast mine, are critical. The blast impact and the blast ejecta decrease quickly
with distance and the further away from the centre of the cone of “extreme high risk”, the safer the
deminer will be, see Figure 2. It is likely, for example, to be safer for the deminer’s head to be close to
the seat of the explosion, but low down, as opposed to the same distance away vertically, in the
“extreme high risk” zone, identified in figure 2.

The report “Enhancing Deminer Safety Through Consideration of Position” [3] demonstrates clearly the
effect that distance has on the risk the deminer is exposed to.

Key: 1 = High risk; 2 = Extreme high risk
Figure 2 — Example of a kneeling deminer relative to a blast cone
The greatest threat for a deminer occurs when exposing a mine, which is normally conducted in a
squatting or kneeling position. These positions present the highest threat to the deminer in the event of
an explosion and are therefore assumed to be the most dangerous.
For test purposes the following position applies: a kneeling operator, with the tip of his nose 550 ± 10
mm from the simulated mine and at an angle of 70° ± 2º from horizontal to top centre, of the simulated
mine.
5.4 Hazard levels
One of the most widespread anti-personnel blast mines is the PMN with an explosive content of 240
grams of TNT. Whilst there are anti-personnel blast mines with a hig
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